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Peace, Love, Competition. An Initial Look at the
Restructuring of Illinois Residential Energy Markets
Robert Kelter*
I. INTRODUCTION
The electric, natural gas, and telephone industries are currently in the
midst of a major transition. After decades of regulation under the
assumption that utilities were natural monopolies, policy makers have
now decided that problems such as high prices and poor service quality
can be cured by opening markets to competition. The word
"competition" has become the mantra of the new millennium, chanted
by free market proponents reminiscent of hippie chants of "peace" and
"love" during the 1960s.
Given the ramifications of this market restructuring for consumers, it
is appropriate to analyze the transition to competition at every step to
ensure that consumers receive the long-term benefits of efficiency that
regulation has sometimes failed to deliver. Even the father of airline
deregulation, Dr. Alfred Kahn, a proponent of limiting regulation in
Illinois in the utility-affiliate rulemaking, noted, "It is necessary to
confront the possibility, finally, that the benefits of the competition
unleashed by deregulation will prove only temporary-that, as many
opponents of deregulation have consistently predicted, competition will
ultimately kill itself off."'
Contrary to public statements by utility officials that consumers are
demanding choice for their electricity and gas, the Citizens Utility
Board (CUB) has received little input from constituents regarding the
right to choose a new electric or gas company. While in the late 1980s
and early 1990s many ComEd customers wanted to escape the
company's high rates stemming from its nuclear build up, even
ComEd's customers have been relatively quiet in the last few years.
* Robert Kelter is the litigation director for Citizens Utility Board (CUB) in Chicago,
Illinois. He has been an attorney at CUB since September 1995. He supervises attorneys
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That is not to say that consumers do not want lower prices and better
service, merely that many do not value choice in and of itself.
In Illinois, consumer advocates have taken the approach that
competition is inevitable and focused on market structure issues, such as
utility-affiliate rules, consumer complaint processes, and public
education programs. Too often the response to consumer protection
concerns during the transition is, "That's competition. You have to let
the market fix the problem." This response is consistent with the
premise that we are "deregulating," rather than "restructuring."
Critics of regulation address concerns regarding utility-affiliate
abuses and fraudulent marketing by casting the debate in "either-or"
terms, as in either you have competition or you have regulation. Yet, in
reality, many industries that are "competitive" are highly regulated,
such as food, insurance, and banking. Do consumers want to worry
about how their bank is handling their money? Would consumers be
comforted by the thought that competition will eventually weed out the
bank if their money is not there when they go to make a withdrawal?
Does it deter competition when grocery stores print the price per unit
for competing products? Of course not. Good consumer protection
laws enhance competition by encouraging efficiency and discouraging
fraudulent marketing.
II. COMPETITION DEFINED
In the simplest terms, competition should produce lower prices and
better service in the long-term. The most efficient company should win
the most customers, and every competitor should be forced to
continually battle to become more efficient in order to maintain or
increase its market share. While there are many definitions for
competition, the Nevada Legislature provides as good a description as
any:
"Effective competition" means, with respect to a particular service,
a market structure and a process under which an individual seller is
not able to influence significantly the price of service as a result of:
1. The number of sellers of service;
2. The size of each seller's share of the market;
3. The ability of the sellers to enter or exit the market; and
4. The price and availability of comparable substitutes for the
service. 2
2. NEV. REV. STAT. 704.969 (repealed 2001).
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Whether customer choice is a worthwhile end in and of itself is
perhaps best summarized by the National Regulatory Research Institute
(NRRI), the research and policy organization funded by the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners:
But customer choice is not a worthwhile end in and of itself unless
the choice is meaningful. Meaningful customer choice maximizes
consumer welfare; that is, consumers are better off either because they
value the services they are receiving more highly than services that
they received before, or because they are receiving the services that
they received before at a lower price, or both.
For customer choice to exist in a manner that maximizes consumer
welfare, two preconditions must be met. One precondition is that
there is in place a market structure that allows each customer to have a
full range of available suppliers from which to choose. For this to
occur there must be at least workable competition. If the market is a
tight oligopoly or even a loose oligopoly where one firm acts as the
dominant firm, then there probably is not the full range of available
suppliers from which to choose. Workable competition is often
defined as there being no fewer than five firms.3
While "competition" sounds enticing, in order to determine whether
consumers ultimately benefit, the costs and risks of shopping must be
evaluated. Consumers who shop may bear the risk of paying higher
prices (as discussed below regarding the Nicor Customer Select
program), and shopping may require considerable time and energy
given the complexity of choosing a natural gas provider. Hence, the
real issue is whether the market is structured in a way that consumers
are likely to benefit.
III. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF REGULATION DURING
THE TRANSITION
Assuming then that competition will not automatically produce
benefits, the next question is what needs to be done to create an efficient
market where the benefits to consumers outweigh the costs/risks.
Regulation is particularly important during the transition from
monopoly to competition. Few competitors in electricity, gas or
telecommunications have chosen to enter all states and utility service
3. Robert E. Burns, Esq., Kenneth Costello, Edwin Rosenberg, Ph.D., & Frank Darr, Esq.,
Market Analyses of Public Utilities: The Now and Future Role of State Commissions (draft, Nat'l
Regulatory Research Inst., July 1999) (revised and published as ROBERT E. BURNS, ESQ.,
KENNETH COSTELLO, EDWIN ROSENBERG, PH.D., & FRANK DARR, ESQ., DYNAMIC MARKET
ANALYSES OF TRANSITIONAL UTILITIES: A ROLE FOR EVOLVING COMMISSIONS (Nat'l
Regulatory Research Inst., 2000)).
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territories equally. In electricity, it has been clear that the few
competitors venturing into new service territories base their decision
whether to enter a market on the level of the barriers to entry. For
example, Green Mountain Energy, touted by promoters of open markets
as an example of a company providing the choice of purchasing
environmentally friendly power, is not in every state that has opened its
market for competition. Nor is New Power Company, one of the few
companies that has targeted residential customers. Both of these
companies have met with CUB and indicated that they will compete in
Illinois only if they believe conditions are conducive to entry by new
competitors.
Some of the barriers facing these companies are simply related to the
price of the product. 4 For instance, the average price of electricity in
Illinois (6.98c/kwh) is much greater than in Indiana (5.29C/kwh),5 and
the price in Ameren/CIPS's price service territory (7.42C/kwh) is
approximately 25% lower than in ComEd's service territory
(9.3 1C/kwh).6  Naturally, competitors can beat the incumbent utility
price more easily where the price is high. While incumbent utility price
plays a major role in determining the level of competition, some barriers
to entry can be controlled by the legislators and regulators.
IV. THE EARLY EVIDENCE INDICATES COMPETITION IS NOT DEVELOPING
AS ANTICIPATED
While it may turn out that competition benefits consumers, today's
reality indicates that legislators and regulators should be carefully
examining how the markets are developing. The evidence in Illinois
indicates that the warning of William G. Shepherd, economist from the
University of Massachusetts is coming to pass:
Deregulation can veer into a market-dominance trap, rather than
march firmly to effective competition. Only if regulatory economics
(controls to get efficient outcomes even under monopoly) is replaced
by industrial-organization economics (which is about real competitive
4. The price consumers pay may include transition charges, designed to compensate the
incumbent utilities for resources allocated to serve customers before restructuring.
5. Energy Information Administration, State Electricity Profiles tbl. 8 (Nov. 20, 2001),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricyt/page/fact-sheets (providing data for utilities
in Indiana and Illinois in 1999).
6. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELECTRIC SALES
STATISTICS FOR CALENDAR YEARS 2000 AND 1999, RESEARCH BULLETIN NUMBER 145, at 3.
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processes, with dynamic impacts) is there a good chance for the
budding competition to become really effective.
7
Despite optimism from commercial and industrial consumers that
competition would deliver better service and lower prices, early results
in Illinois are not particularly promising. In the electric industry, since
the restructuring law of 1997, every major electric company in Illinois
has been bought out by or merged with another company:
ComEd/PECO, Illinois Power/Dynegy, CIPS/UE (now Ameren),
Central Illinois Light Company/AES. The strategy seems to be that
only by becoming bigger can a company be competitive. Or, only by
becoming bigger can a company ensure that it can protect its own
service territory from competition.
All commercial customers have been eligible for choice in Illinois
since October 1, 1999.8 As of July 1, 2001, not one customer had
switched in Central Illinois Light Company's (CILCO) service
territory. 9 In Ameren/CIPS's territory 820 out of 45,013 eligible
customers had switched, for Illinois Power 1,026 out of 91,928, and for
CoinEd 14,165 out of 527,450 had switched. 10 While ComEd's service
territory seems to have some level of legitimate competition, the
enthusiasm is tempered by the fact that over half of the ComEd
customers who "switched" are merely taking service from ConEd
under a different arrangement, called the Purchased Power Option
(PPO), which allows customers to buy power from the utility at the
market rate." l Moreover, the statistic does not reflect the fact that half
of those who actually switched providers (i.e. not taking the PPO) have
switched to ComEd's generation affiliate. While the Illinois Commerce
Commission (ICC) statistics do not list competitors' shares, ICC
statistics indicate three competitors in ComEd's service territory
captured 83% of the market. 12 One of these competitors is a ConEd
affiliate, another was Enron, and the other is AES. 13
7. William G. Shepherd, Deregulation from Monopoly Only to Dominance?, 17 NRRI Q.
BULL. 149 (1966).
8. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-104(a)(1) (2000).
9. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF CHAIRMAN'S FALL 2001 ROUNDTABLE
DISCUSSIONS 11-12 (Nov. 2001).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 13. Despite these statistics to the contrary, at recent legislative hearings on
competition in Springfield, CILCO, which has not lost one customer, and the others claimed that
competition is working in Illinois.
12. Illinois Commerce Commission, Assessment of Retail and Wholesale Market Competition
in the Illinois Electric Industry, Apr. 2001, at 10, available at http://www.icc.state.il.us/icc/ecl
docs/0 I 0503genrepcomp.doc.
13. Id.
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V. EXAMINATION OF THE NICOR CUSTOMER SELECT PROGRAM
DEMONSTRATES THE POTENTIAL FOR AFFILIATE DOMINATION
Since the onset of competition, the Citizens Utility Board has focused
extensively on ensuring that new rules regarding utility-affiliate
relationships limit the ability of utilities to transfer unearned economic
advantages to their affiliates. CUB's cause for concern has been that by
passing on advantages to affiliates, utilities can continue to dominate the
market in a way that creates a new monopoly. Kenneth Costello,
Associate Director for Electric and Gas Research for the NRRI, outlined
the concern in a recent NRRI report on gas customer choice programs:
The evidence from various programs coincides with economic theory
saying that the savings must be adequate to offset the risks and
transaction costs associated with consumers switching to a new
provider, this condition is especially relevant in a market where the
local utility has been the sole provider and the only entity with name
recognition. Overcoming this so-called first-mover advantage, which
is not necessarily problematic, makes it more difficult for independent
marketers to establish themselves and create a presence that erodes the
dominance of the incumbent utility. In all markets, incumbents have
an inherent advantage over new entrants; one reason derives from the
positive reputation of an incumbent (if that is in fact true), which a
new entrant must try to neutralize with advertising and other
informational activities. Consumers, in turn, have to incur high costs
to acquire information on new entrants. 14
The opening of the gas market in Illinois demonstrates some of the
problems outlined by Mr. Costello. The two largest gas utilities in
Illinois, Nicor Gas and Peoples Gas, have allowed commercial
customers to shop in recent years, and Nicor has allowed 15% of its
residential customers (260,000) to shop under its Customer Select
program.' 5  While Peoples has not released any statistics regarding
competitor market share, the numbers in the Nicor pilot are telling.
Nicor's affiliate, Nicor Energy, has dominated the "open" market,
gaining 93% of the residential customers choosing a new provider and
72% of the commercial customers. 16
Despite a myriad of problems with the market in Nicor's service
territory, the Illinois Commerce Commission recently voted to expand
14. KENNETH W. COSTELLO, HOUSEHOLD PARTICIPATION IN GAS CUSTOMER CHOICE
PROGRAMS: SOME FACTS, EXPLANATIONS, AND LESSONS LEARNED, IV (Nat'l Regulatory
Research Inst., No. 99-05, Jan. 1999).
15. Illinois Commerce Commission Order No. 00-0620 & 00-0621 at 3 (July 5, 2001),
available at http://eweb.icc.state.il.us/e-docket.
16. Id. at 9.
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Customer Select to all Nicor Gas customers. 17 The Citizens Utility
Board, the Illinois Attorney General, and the Cook County State's
Attorney all opposed any further expansion until the Commission
addressed the problems with the program, particularly the dominance by
Nicor Energy.
Throughout the proceeding in which the Commission considered
Nicor's application to expand competition to all customers, Nicor
emphasized that customers wanted choice, and the company ignored
concerns that the benefits of shopping did not necessarily outweigh the
costs/risks. 18 In some months of the pilot Nicor Energy customers
saved money, but in some they did not. The offers customers received
were confusing to the extent that no residential or small business
customer could possibly understand what they were purchasing. Two
years ago, Nicor Energy customers signed up for an offer that they
thought locked them in at 26 cents per therm, when in reality that offer
only locked them in at that price if the market price dropped to 26 cents
per therm. The offer was actually for a price based on the Natural Gas
Intelligence monthly index plus 3.5 cents per therm-a truly
incomprehensible offer to a typical residential or small business
customer. Last year, only two other companies besides Nicor Energy
registered to serve residential customers, and only Nicor Energy
actively pursued customers. Corn Belt Energy offered customers a
variable rate based on the company's gas costs, plus 3.9 cents per therm,
FirstEnergy Services offered the Natural Gas Intelligence price plus 3.8
cents per therm, and Nicor Energy offered the Natural Gas Intelligence
price plus 3.89 cents per therm. 19 These rates were neither comparable
to each other, nor to the regulated Nicor Gas rate. The average
customer has no idea how Nicor Gas purchases gas for its customers or
how that price gets passed through in their monthly bills. The average
customer has no idea how Nicor Gas's prices compare to other utilities
around the country, or why its unregulated affiliate, Nicor Energy,
would be able to provide lower prices than the utility.
What customers do know, however, is that Nicor Energy uses the
Nicor Gas name and logo. Moreover, Nicor Energy's marketing
implies that customers will save by switching to Nicor Energy and
17. Id.
18. Utility gas customers already pay market-based rates passed through by the utilities. The
law requires that utilities.provide this gas prudently. See 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-220(a)
(2000).
19. Nicor's Customer Select Program, CUBFACTS (Citizens Utility Board, Chi., I11.) Winter
2001, available at http://www.citizensutilityboard.org.
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downplays or completely ignores the risk that the company is
unregulated, and customers might in fact end up paying a higher price if
they switch. Thus, the customer perceives an opportunity to save
money with little risk.
The Citizens Utility Board and the other consumer representatives in
Illinois have stressed that the Commission needs to prohibit Nicor
Energy from using the Nicor name and logo. This would not only level
the playing field for new market entrants, it would drastically reduce the
chance that customers will sign up for offers they do not understand
because they believe that Nicor Energy guarantees them savings or that
Nicor Energy is regulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission.
In essence, the record in the investigation of the Customer Select
program indicated that the Customer Select program represents nothing
more than Nicor Gas's attempt to shift customers to its unregulated
affiliate Nicor Energy.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE NICOR CASE
A. Limit the Ability of the Utility to Determine the Framework
The problem started from day one when the Commission allowed
Nicor Gas to design the Customer Select program. It is simply
inconceivable that Nicor Gas would propose a program that would truly
open the market to competition in a way that would encourage new
market entrants and permit erosion of Nicor's profits. Such a proposal
by the company would clearly violate its obligation to its shareholders.
Given the fact that competitors have choices, the market must be
structured in a way that limits barriers to entry. Moreover, the transition
period is critical because once one competitor gains dominance, it can
often reduce competition by exerting market power. Regulatory and
utility sources indicate the cost of customer acquisition for residential
customers can range anywhere from $15020 to $20021 per customer.
The flow of money stops when investors deem a market to be a lost
cause. And in fact, in both the CILCO and Nicor pilots this has turned
out to be the case. In both cases the utility's affiliate gained early
dominance of the market, and competitors left. As mentioned above, in
the Nicor Customer Select pilot five competitors offered residential
20. Indicated to CUB in an off-record conversation with supplier.
21. Costello, supra note 14, at 17.
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service in 1999, and by 2000 the number was down to three,22 with only
Nicor Energy actively pursuing customers.
B. Limit the Ability of the Utility to Transfer Unearned Competitive
Advantages to the Affiliate
The utility-affiliate abuse issue has been around for a long time.
Ameren/CIPS's witness in the electric utility-affiliate rulemaking, the
aforementioned Dr. Alfred Kahn, noted the incentive for abuse many
years ago:
[T]he regulated companies-even more, their promoters and
managers-have extracted some of these potential monopoly profits
by paying excess prices to affiliated, unregulated companies for
equipment, supplies, financial advice and underwriting, engineering,
and managerial services-charges included in the cost of service and
recovered from customers. 23
Today, the risk remains great, but it has changed with the times. Instead
of utilities paying affiliates too much for products and services, now the
risk is that the utility will transfer unearned economic advantages to its
affiliates, including, foremost, instant name recognition and credibility,
in a way that benefits the affiliate to the detriment of the market.
In Illinois, after significant effort by consumer advocates to ban gas
affiliates from using the utility name and logo, the Commission has
required affiliates to add a disclaimer warning customers that the
affiliate is unregulated and that regardless of which company the
customer chooses to supply its gas, its service from Nicor Gas will not
be affected.24 However, a disclaimer is not likely to clarify the situation
sufficiently to reduce the likelihood that consumers will sign up with an
affiliate much more readily than with a non-affiliate competitor.
C. The Commission Needs to Actively Monitor the Market
To a great extent, each state commission must decide how active a
role it will play in the restructuring process-whether it will passively
wait to see how things play out on terms set by incumbent utilities, or
whether it will attempt to set a framework that encourages the
development of competition. On the electric side, the legislature
22. Customer Select-Making the Right Choice, CUBFACTS (Citizens Utility Board, Chi., Ill.)
Apr. 2002, available at http://www.citizensutilityboard.org; Nicor's Customer Select Program,
CUBFACTS (Citizens Utility Board, Chi., I11.) Winter 2001, available at http://www.
citizensutilityboard.org.
23. KAHN, supra note 1, at 28.
24. Illinois Commerce Commission Order No. 00-0586 at 9 & app. A (Sept. 18, 2001),
available at http://eweb.icc.state.il.us/e-docket.
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specifically states the ICC "should act to promote the development of an
effectively competitive electricity market ...."25
Experience in Illinois indicates that commissions need to take
initiative and ensure the market is properly structured at the outset.
Additionally, the commission should take an active approach in
monitoring marketing materials and listening to consumer concerns,
without waiting for customers to bring formal complaints. Individual
residential and small business customers often do not suffer enough
financial injury to justify bringing a costly complaint, but that does not
mean that their interests should not be protected. Moreover,
competitors are often reluctant to spend resources challenging a
competitor, particularly if the competitor is a utility affiliate. Not only
is cost an issue, but the competitor is dependent on the utility for
delivery services.
VII. THE GOAL SHOULD BE TO PROVIDE CONSUMERS WITH THE
GREATEST LEVEL OF BENEFITS POSSIBLE
Some economists, and of course many utilities, argue that just
because there are no competitors other than the utility affiliate, it does
not mean that competition is not working if consumers have saved
money. Their position is that if the threat of entry by competitors forces
utilities to keep prices lower than they should be, then competition is
working. However, this response answers the wrong question. The
question should not simply be whether consumers saved any money in
the short-term. The question should be: Is competition producing long-
term efficiencies in a way that provides optimal benefits to customers?
25. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-IO1A(d) (2000).
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